‘Discretion’ should have no place in determining degree classifications

After more than a year of studying in what social scientists might call “zones of uncertainty” during the pandemic, thousands of final-year UK undergraduates will – unbeknownst to them – also find themselves within so-called zones of consideration this summer.

That is, they will have qualified by right for a degree in one classification, but, since their results are at the high end of that range, they will be eligible for an upgrade at the examiners’ discretion.

These zones of consideration are commonplace in UK universities and typically lie between one and three percentage points below each of the degree classification borderlines. They have come under recent scrutiny because of concerns that they contribute to grade inflation. But they deserve further consideration for a more fundamental reason: they are either unnecessary or unfair.

Let’s take a typical example, using the traditional 0-100 marking scale. In any given university, there will be a proportion of students who have final weighted averages between 68 and 69.99 per cent. The regulations of the hypothetical university in question specify that its examination boards should use discretion to determine whether these students should receive the upper-second-class honours degree for which they have automatically qualified or be “moved” to a first-class degree.

Over three decades in UK higher education I have heard the full range of arguments either way. “Exit velocity” is one line of argument used by promoters. This states that if a student performs particularly well in their final year but falls just short of the 70 per cent threshold because of poorer earlier performance, their degree classification should reflect the fact that they are “exiting” university at a first-class standard.

“Long-term consistency” is the complementary argument. A student who, throughout their studies, has been working on or around the upper-second/first-class threshold but has ultimately fallen just short may be argued to be so close, over such a sustained period, that the benefit of the doubt should go in their favour.

My juxtaposition of these two arguments is deliberate because it illustrates the ways in which examination boards, charged with using their discretion, can narrate the patterns of data before them in various contrasting ways. And some of those narrations distort the effects of the algorithm that has been used to calculate the overall average in the first place. For example, it is frequently the case that final-year performance is already more heavily weighted than performance in earlier years. The exit velocity argument quite simply adds even greater weight to the final-year marks. It’s a kind of double counting and it raises the question of why even greater weight has not simply been built into the degree algorithm in the first place if that is to be the basis on which awards are made.

Another factor that an examination board might consider is “engagement”. This is often measured by a student’s attendance record. But why should this be a matter for discretion? If engagement is deemed relevant to degree classification, why should we not simply make it unambiguously clear to students that a certain attendance level will qualify them for a higher award should they fall within the zone of consideration?

If the criteria that are being used to determine outcomes for students are deployed systematically, they can just as easily be built into degree regulations. Discretion is, therefore, unnecessary.

If, on the other hand, these criteria are not deployed systematically, that raises the question of whether those students who are not moved up have been treated fairly. On what basis, other than clear, transparent criteria, have the discretionary awards not been made?

One familiar defence of zones of consideration is that they enable sensitivity to specific local circumstances. I remain unconvinced that this is anything more than post hoc justification of custom and practice. Another is that some students will “just miss out” because of extenuating circumstances, such as hardship. But extenuating circumstances should be dealt with by enabling students to produce their best work, not by adjusting outcomes.

Besides, hardship or no hardship, there will always be someone just below the line, wherever you draw it: what about all those who fall just below 68 per cent, for instance? Fairness is about being absolutely clear where that line is and the criteria that will be employed to determine whether or not a student has crossed it.

My concern is that students at the same university and even on the same course with identical profiles on relevant criteria will sometimes be awarded different degree outcomes. When that happens, it is not fair. And if that does not happen, what has been the role of discretion?

Andy Grayson is an associate professor of psychology at Nottingham Trent University.