Amid the attacks on DEI and science funding, it has been easy to overlook some of the less headline-grabbing aspects of the Trump administration’s wholesale assault on research and scholarly enquiry. But one of those aspects – the modification or removal of data from government open data sites – could prove just as detrimental to global research.
Scholars have attempted to safeguard their work by turning to sites deemed to be beyond the reach of the US government, including Wikimedia projects like Wikidata and Wikimedia Commons; institutional repositories; preprint archives such as Zenodo and arXiv; and the Internet Archive and its Wayback Machine. The last of those is of particular value in preserving the pre-purge versions of websites and their data.
However, even these safe havens may be at risk if a seemingly innocuous tax bill completes its course through Congress.
H.R. 9495, the “Stop Terror-Financing and Tax Penalties on American Hostages Act”, was passed by the US House of Representatives in November 2024 and is currently before the Senate. It proposes – not unreasonably – to strip non-profit status from organisations deemed to be “supporting terrorism”. But its broad language, lack of evidentiary requirements, and potential for political weaponisation should send a chill down the spines of all higher education professionals.
After all, who is to define terrorism? History is filled with examples of liberation movements and resistance groups initially labelled “terrorists” by powerful states. And who is to define “support”? The very act of engaging with complicated geopolitical issues – a cornerstone of academic inquiry – could be construed as supportive of a group deemed “terrorist” by the US government. “Material support” could be deemed to include not just providing money but also communicating information, hosting of events or even providing a platform for dissenting voices.
This is where the legislation’s reach becomes truly global and alarming. Consider the potential impact on globally used resources for research and knowledge dissemination and preservation, such as Wikipedia and the Internet Archive. These platforms could be targeted for hosting content that, while potentially balanced or neutral, is deemed positive towards, or even simply informative about, organisations the US government considers “terrorist”. The sheer volume of content and diversity of perspectives such sites host make them particularly vulnerable. Stripped of their non-profit status, these organisations could find themselves no longer financially viable – and not just in the US.
The potential for political weaponisation is particularly alarming. A government seeking to silence dissenting voices could exploit the bill’s broad language to target institutions critical of its policies. Consider the American Library Association (ALA), an organisation that champions intellectual freedom. If it supports libraries that refuse to ban books that the US government deems supportive of a terrorist group, the ALA could potentially be penalised – with knock-on effects for any international libraries or universities that are members, or that collaborate with the ALA.
Lest readers think the targeting of organisations like the ALA unlikely, consider that we have already seen states including Georgia, Louisiana and Alabama attempting to prohibit state-funded (public) librarians from membership of the ALA.
The international nature of research collaborations further amplifies the risk. Many universities worldwide partner with US institutions on research projects. If any aspect of such projects is deemed to violate H.R. 9495, the entire collaboration could be jeopardised. Imagine a collaborating overseas university hosting a conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, featuring speakers from Palestinian organisations. If the US government deems one of those organisations a terrorist entity, the US partner university could find itself indirectly implicated.
The potential for this legislation to stifle academic freedom is very real. It echoes historical precedents in which governments have used national security concerns to suppress dissent and curtail intellectual inquiry – with institutions self-censoring to avoid potential repercussions.
A concerted effort is needed to raise awareness among academics, administrative staff and sector leaders and policymakers, ensuring they are aware of the potential risks associated with partnering with organisations that might be deemed “terrorist” by the US government (while upholding the principles of academic freedom).
Mechanisms for collaborative defence of academic freedom with US counterparts may be required. This could involve joint statements, shared legal resources, or even taking a greater share of responsibility for the hosting of events or research projects that could have ramifications under H.R. 9495. That would ensure that US colleagues are not unfairly penalised for engaging in legitimate academic inquiry.
Overseas institutions may also need to consider hosting data or servers for collaborative projects, or mirroring US-based sites, to protect information that could become a point of contention under the new legislation.
If academia could afford to shrug when the House passed H.R. 9495 last autumn, Trump’s actions since he returned to the Oval Office illustrate how misplaced such complacency is. The threat posed by both the legislation and the actions of the US administration must be proactively addressed at a global level to ensure academic freedom is actively defended.
Caroline Ball is academic librarian at the University of Derby.
